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Abstract
In a 2006 article, Duncan Kennedy identifies politics as the central dilemma of contemporary legal 
thought, but affirms that law is non-reducible to politics, which could be read as a partial retraction from 
the known coda “law is politics.” This article suggests an interpretation of his refusal to conflate law and 
politics not in terms of disavowal, or a way of distancing politics from law, but as an attempt to carve out 
a space from where to think of the relational aspect between law and politics. This becomes necessary 
due to a current phenomenon which Pierre Schlag calls “dedifferentiation,” where no distinction – 
and hence no relation – seems to be possible between law and other spheres of life. Opposing that 
conclusion, this article contends that engendering relations allows us to keep the terms connected 
in relative motion. The article then moves to describe four distinct modes of framing the relation 
between law and politics, which gives rise to very different disciplinary projects: law as politics, dating 
back to the legal realist movement; law as political science, which finds its current expression in empirical 
and quantitative research; law as political philosophy, generated by a renewed interest in “the political”; 
and law as political contingent, growing out of a similar interest but challenging the boundary-setting 
ambitions of philosophy. While the latter has not yet been adequately translated into law, I suggest as 
an alternative the work of Jacques Rancière, which declines to grant an aura of invincible ubiquity to any 
totalizing description, including neoliberalism’s attempt to present itself as a world system.
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In his 2006 article “Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000,” 
Duncan Kennedy develops a structural mapping of three distinct waves of globalization.1 
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published in Law and Contemporary Problems 78 (2015) and in Law & Critique 25 (2014).
  5. A forceful criticism (which I cannot fully pursue in this article) is that Kennedy does not 
grapple with neoliberalism, understood not as a right-wing ideology but as itself a mode of 
thought, see Christopher Tomlins, “The Presence and Absence of Legal Mind,” Law and 
Contemporary Problems 78(1 & 2) (2015), 1–17. This failure to come to terms with neo-
liberalism has been read symptomatically as the element that could explain the demise (and 
lack of intellectual punch) of the CRITS in contemporary legal scholarship, see Corinne 
Blalock, “Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Legal Theory,” Law and Contemporary Problems 
77(4) ( 2014), 71–103.
  6. Kennedy, op. cit., at p. 72.
Drawing on Saussure’s langue/parole distinction, Kennedy aims to single out each peri-
od’s legal consciousness, understood not as a particular ideology, jurisprudence, or set of 
rules, but rather as conceptual vocabulary, reasoning, and arguments – which are diversi-
fied as multiple local paroles.2 Between 1850–1914, the first globalization (“classical 
legal thought”) emphasizes the theory of the “will” and private autonomy; between 
1900–1968, the second globalization (“the social”) emphasizes law as purposive activity 
and regulatory mechanism; between 1945–2000, the third globalization (“contemporary 
legal thought”) lacks a discernible unifying concept and combines neoformalism from 
the first wave and policy analysis (or balancing) from the second.
Kennedy does not offer a causal explanation as to why these modes of thought 
emerged in the way they did, or what determined their content, but he identifies different 
provenances (Germany, France, and United States respectively), a prominent actor (an 
academic professor, a legislator, and a judge respectively), and a central dilemma for 
each: during the first, the question was the extent to which law should be moral; in the 
second, the question was the relation between law and society; in the third, the question 
is the relationship between law and politics, and thus the dilemma for the contemporary 
judge, who “simultaneously represents law against legislative politics domestically and 
sovereign politics internationally, and must defend the charge that he/she is a usurper, 
doing ‘politics by other means’.”3
While many aspects of Kennedy’s article merit attention,4 it is not his periodization, 
methodology, narrative, conclusions, or blind spots5 that claim my interest here, but 
some critical reflections on the connection that he makes between law and politics at the 
end of his long article. In the final passages, Kennedy claims that the political ideologies 
pursued through contemporary legal consciousness are not internally coherent, which is 
surprisingly “an important antidote to the tendency to see a discussion of the politics of 
the law as reducing law to politics.”6 This reduction is impossible, so Kennedy claims, 
because the projects of the right and left oscillate between different poles (for example, 
libertarianism and social conservatism on the right; feminist politics of identity and 
queer theoretical anti-identity politics of sexual liberation on the left), which means that 
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level of analysis, and for some purposes, law both is politics and is not”), in theoretical 
terms he is “bewildered” (at 28).
 11. Ibid., 28.
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their content is no more “decidable” than was the question of legal validity for legal 
formalists. In fact, “[w]hen one traces the phenomenology of judging under uncertainty 
into the choice of an interpretation of one’s politics, it turns out that there’s an hermeneu-
tic circle” whereby the “[c]ommitments of an actor within a legal consciousness shape 
politics as well as the reverse.”7 Kennedy concludes:
Even in Clausewitz’s famous formulation, war is politics by other means, not “just” politics. In 
Carl Schmitt’s flip of Clausewitz, politics is war by other means, but not reducible to war. … If 
law is politics, it is so, again, by other means, and there is much to be said, nonreductively, 
about those means. By analogy with Schmitt, it seems to me also true that politics is law by 
other means, in the sense that politics flows as much as from the unmeetable demand for ethical 
rationality in the world as from the economic interests or pure power lust with which it is so 
often discursively associated.8
This tersely written final passage is not easily unpacked. Why does Kennedy insist that 
modern legal consciousness is not reducible to politics? Is the self-professed CRIT per-
haps reversing course from the known coda “law is politics” and saying instead that law 
and politics are ontologically distinct? Precisely because he identifies politics as the 
driver of contemporary legal thinking, and yet refuses to reduce all law to politics, it 
makes sense to ask: What is the position that Kennedy is trying to articulate?
This is one of the questions posed by John Henry Schlegel’s critical reading.9 While 
professing admiration for Kennedy’s article, Schlegel confesses his difficulty in coming 
to terms with its conclusion. In particular Schlegel is “bothered” by Kennedy’s attempt 
to set law apart from politics, and finds it hard to understand “why he insists on differen-
tiating law from those things (e.g. politics, economics, culture), with which it is ‘inextri-
cably intertwined’.”10 After considering several hypotheses, Schlegel finds an assertion 
of the relative autonomy of each, namely, “the assertion that there is a core of economics, 
of law, of politics, that is not shared with the others.”11 In doing so, Kennedy would be 
positing some “core” or “Aristotelian essence” and privileging law as the claimant of 
intellectual primacy.12
Although I do not presume to know what drives Kennedy (nor does this appear clearly 
stated anywhere in his text), I would suggest an interpretation of his refusal to conflate 
law and politics not in terms of disavowal, or a way of pushing politics away from law, 
but rather as an attempt to carve out a space from where to think about their mutual rela-
tion. In that reading, this space would be needed, though not to justify the relative auton-
omy of law or its priority; nor even to create a place for the critic to inhabit, as if above 
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the fray of legal and political melees.13 Rather, this space would serve to express the 
relational aspect between law and politics, the relevance of which requires a detour that 
will hopefully serve to lay the groundwork for the second part of my article.
Indeed, Kennedy is struggling to articulate this position more clearly for a reason. 
This is due to a current phenomenon which Pierre Schlag calls “dedifferentiation.”14 For 
Schlag, the most sophisticated contemporary theories of law lead us to a point where we 
are no longer able to distinguish law from culture, or society, or the market, or politics, 
or anything of the sort. The problem begins “with the recognition that law determines, 
constitutes, constructs, shapes or otherwise ‘verbs’ the social, and the social in turn deter-
mines, constitutes, shapes or otherwise ‘verbs’ the law.”15 For example, Austin Sarat and 
Thomas Kearns argue that “[t]o recognize that law has meaning-making power, then, is 
to see that social practices are not logically separable from the laws that shape them and 
that social practices are unintelligible apart from the legal norms that give rise to them.”16 
In turn, Naomi Mezey suggests that “[p]erhaps we should not speak of ‘relationship’ . . . 
at all, as this tends to reinforce the distinction between concepts that my description here 
seeks to deny.”17 For Schlag this entails that “[i]dentities previously thought separate and 
distinct . . . turn out to be inextricably intertwined. Each is already inextricably the other 
– in ways that cannot be disentangled through any definition, specification, stipulation or 
theorization.”18 According to Schlag, the dedifferentiation problem is not some claim 
that the relations between law and the social (or law and politics, law and economics, law 
and language, and so on) are complicated or difficult to articulate, but that “there is noth-
ing to be said about the relations between the two identities because we were never 
entitled to separate them out in the first place.”19 This stark conclusion has not suffi-
ciently dawned on legal theory, which has traditionally got off the ground by distinguish-
ing law from something else (morality, society, politics, aesthetics, and so forth).20
How fatal is this for an argument, like the one in this article, which seeks to think 
through the relationship between law and politics? A few pages after the passage 
cited, Mezey states conclusively: “While I agree that law and culture do not exist 
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 25. Desmond Manderson, Kangaroo Courts and the Rule of Law: The Legacy of Modernism 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), esp. chapter 1.
independently of each other, I disagree that their necessary interconnections make them 
indistinguishable from one another.”21 Moreover, she also affirms that “if one were to 
talk about the relationship between law and culture, it would certainly be right to say that 
it is always dynamic, interactive, and dialectical.”22 Therefore, Schlag overstates his 
point when concluding that there is nothing to be said about their relations. Mezey seems 
to be warning not against distinctions, but against reifying tendencies when doing so, 
treating each term of the relationship “as if they were two discrete realms of action and 
discourse,”23 or Aristotelian essences in Schlegel’s language. Simply put, the problem is 
not the relation, but what to make of it.
One way to untangle the paradox of Mezey’s “non-relational relation” is to mark a 
shift from the simple connector “and” to the different “as,”24 which already introduces a 
logic of differentiation. To define something as something else (i.e., as something other 
than traditionally defined – be it as culture, politics, rhetoric, society, justice…) is to 
suggest this relation is not conventionally given, but imaginatively engendered. In fact, 
to think of law as something else does the opposite of demarcating separate and autono-
mous spheres, for it maintains both in relative motion. This is in fact a critique that can 
be levelled against the separation thesis of legal positivism, the colonization of law by 
economics, or the fetishization of certain strands of law and literature, where literature is 
thought to possess the attributes that would come to redeem law.25 This is also true of the 
claim “law is politics,” which aimed to poke holes in the thick armor of legalism. As a 
reminder that an ineradicable political element exists in every legal judgment, “law is 
politics” makes good sense insofar as someone opposes it. If, on the other hand, one 
takes the sentence as a free-standing ontological claim, then it hides more than it reveals, 
as it misses or distorts aspects of both law and politics. Accordingly, the copulative “is” 
does not actually express a relation of identity between both terms, but of productive 
tension – both among the terms themselves and with their implied audience.
To establish a relation, then, does not entail fixing core identities, because the mean-
ing of each term fluctuates depending on how the connection is established. To think of 
the relation between law and politics is to reflect not only on the nature of the connector 
(copulative, disjunctive, supplementary, metonymical, and so forth), but about the entire 
assemblage of co-implication enacted by that definition. This is precisely what Kennedy 
seems to be doing when keeping law and politics connected “by other means,” yet resist-
ing the reduction of law to politics, which can be read as a slight self-critique of earlier 
views where law would mimetically replicate ideology.
Hence my second, and most significant point: to inquire how exactly the relationship 
between law and politics is configured enables us to identify at least four projects within 
what Kennedy calls contemporary legal thought and into the twenty-first century. First, 
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 26. See Mónica López Lerma and Julen Etxabe (eds), Rancière and Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 
forthcoming).
 27. Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New 
York: Basic Books, 1983), pp. 173–184.
 28. Roscoe Pound, “Mechanical Jurisprudence,” Columbia Law Review 8 (1908), 605–23. To 
make the law more “scientific” was then to bring it closer to the rest of the social sciences, 
rather than as an autonomous, self-sufficient discipline (see also Pound, “The Scope and 
Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence,” Harvard Law Review 25 (1912), 140–68).
 29. The reference is to Rudolf von Jhering’s satirical text “In the Heaven of Legal Concepts: 
A Fantasy,” trans. Charlotte Levy, Temple Law Quarterly 58 (1985), 799–842 [originally 
published in 1884].
 30. Felix Cohen, “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,” Columbia Law 
Review 35 (1935), 809–49, 810.
law as politics, dating back to the legal realist movement and recently revived; second, 
law as political science, which finds its current expression in empirical and quantitative 
research. Third, law as political philosophy, generated by a renewed interest in “the 
political” in continental philosophy. Fourth, law as the political contingent, growing out 
of a similar interest, but challenging the boundary-setting ambitions of philosophy. 
While the latter project has not yet been adequately translated into law, I would suggest 
the work of Jacques Rancière as an avenue for future work. 26
My purpose is not to “map” contemporary legal scholarship, but to delineate four 
major lines of intersection, examine their underlying assumptions, and ultimately defend 
my own scholarly preference for the last of these as the most promising rejoinder to our 
contemporary predicament. These categories of analysis are not “deep structures” as in 
Kennedy’s three globalizations. Rather, they are sites or intersecting nodes for possible 
linkages between law and politics. They are not so much approaches to law and politics, 
but rather modes of constituting their interaction, which do not preexist like a glove for 
the hand, but are formed whenever we act on their presuppositions. In my preferred 
understanding, law and politics are not discrete “fields” to be united or separated, but 
distinct ways of making sense of the real as Clifford Geertz might put it.27 The connector 
“as” signals the oscillation or interval between modes of combining the two terms (and 
their permutations).
I. Law as Politics
Exemplary of this modality is the American legal realist movement. This is not the place 
to rehearse a well-known story, but legal realism can best be understood as an attack 
against formalist “legal science” as practiced by legal dogmatics and perfected by the 
pandectist school in Germany. Rationalist-idealist science, which differs greatly from the 
more empiricist science advocated by realists, prioritized abstraction of first principles, 
deductive reasoning, logical consistency, and systematization.28 In what to my mind is 
still the sharpest expression of this critique, Felix Cohen referred to legal science oozing 
scholasticism as “transcendental nonsense.” That is, a science in “the heaven of legal 
concepts”29 preoccupied with metaphysical “essences,” akin to theologians arguing 
about “how many angels can stand on the point of a needle.”30 Cohen noted critically that 
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 32. Ibid., 820.
 33. See Pound, “Sociological Jurisprudence.”
 34. Jhering, The Struggle for Law (1872).
 35. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1881), p. 1.
 36. See Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1921), pp. 104-5 (arguing that Savigny’s conception of law as developing silently and 
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 37. For the former, Pound, “A Survey of Social Interests,” Harvard Law Review 57 (1943), 
1–39; for the latter, John Dewey, “Logical Method and Law,” Cornell Law Quarterly 10 
(1924), 17–27.
 38. Robert L. Hale, “Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,” 
The Political Science Quarterly 38 (1923), 470–94; also Morris Cohen, “Property and 
Sovereignty,” Cornell Law Quarterly 13 (1927), 8–30.
 39. Karl Llewellyn, “Some Realism about Realism,” Harvard Law Review 44 (1931), 1222–64, 
1252.
“to justify or criticize legal rules in purely legal terms is always to argue in a vicious 
circle,”31 just as “Molière’s physician’s discovery that opium puts men to sleep because 
it contains a dormitive principle.”32 Realists decried the self-sufficiency and separation 
of legal science from the rest of the social sciences – including a political interpretation 
of jurisprudence.33
Within this realist frame, politics appears not only in the realists’ attempt to “de-
purify” legal science, but also in their understanding of law. For the realists, law is nei-
ther a formal and systematic abstraction, nor something that grows and evolves naturally 
as does a society’s Volksgeist, but rather the result of multiple social forces (closer to the 
thesis of social struggle defended by Jhering against Savigny34) and memorialized in 
Holmes’ “the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”35 At the same 
time, the growth of law was also the result of purposeful activity.36 Realists understood 
law “as a means to an end” (in reference to another of Rudolf von Jhering’s works), 
which opened it up to all forms of instrumental rationality (Max Weber), in efforts either 
of social engineering or progressive reform.37
Thirdly, the politics of realism appears most visibly in the analysis of legal relations 
(e.g. employer/employee; landlord/tenant; factory owner/worker). Realists shared an anti-
Lochnerian outlook and criticized laissez faire liberalism as protecting entrenched inter-
ests, rather than as a neutral protector of individual rights. Instead, realists analyzed 
property and contractual relations not as derived from private autonomy, but as relations 
of power, where the state both created and enforced this regime through coercion.38 Lastly, 
politics also appears in the theory of adjudication: neither legal rules nor syllogistic rea-
soning could determine the outcome of cases, which inevitably entailed choice.39 Realists 
were not the first to observe that rules alone do not constrain the judge (some positivists 
like Austin and Kelsen did, too), but they pragmatically embraced considerations of pol-
icy (Pound), purpose (Cardozo), consequences (Dewey), and function (F. Cohen).
It has become a commonplace to say that “we are all legal realists now,” but this 
seems more an attempt to domesticate realism’s critical edge. Rather, realism suffered a 
bifurcation: first, a social scientific orientation towards policy analysis, impact studies, 
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 40. Robert Gordon, “New Developments in Legal Theory,” in David Kairys (ed.), The Politics 
of Law: A Progressive Critique (New York: Pantheon, 1982).
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97–166.
 42. B.Z. Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 1, 101.
 43. A programmatic statement for NLR can be found in H.S. Erlanger et al., “Is it Time for a 
New Legal Realism?” Wisconsin Law Review (2005), 335–63. See also V. Nourse and G. 
Shaffer, “Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal 
Theory?,” Cornell Law Review 95 (2009), 61–137.
 44. Andrew Lang, “New Legal Realism, Empiricism, and Scientism: The Relative Objectivity 
of Law and Social Science,” Leiden Journal of International Law 28 (2015), 231–54, 232; 
Stewart Macaulay, “The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: ‘Things Ain’t What They Used 
to Be’” Wisconsin Law Review (2005), 365–403.
 45. G. Shaffer, “The New Legal Realist Approach to International Law,” Leiden Journal of 
International Law 28 (2015), 189–210, 202, citation omitted.
 46. Lang, op. cit, 240. See also A. McEvoy, “A New Legal Realism for Legal Studies,” 
Wisconsin Law Review (2005), 433–54.
 47. Sally Engle Merry, “New Legal Realism and the Ethnography of Transnational Law,” Law 
& Social Inquiry 31(4) (2006), 975–95.
 48. e.g. G. Shaffer and T. Ginsburg, “The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship,” 
The American Journal of International Law 106(1) (2012), 1–46 (reporting studies in inter-
national law).
and efficiency in law and society and law and economics; second, a more critical orienta-
tion (critical also of the realists’ positivist epistemology) such as critical legal studies 
(CLS), feminist legal scholars, critical race theory, post-colonial studies, and more.40 The 
distinctive aspect is the view of law and politics as equally instrumental, which may have 
been the realists’ most enduring legacy.41 As Brian Tamanaha writes, the instrumental 
view of law, the idea that law is a means to an end, is so taken for granted today that it 
rarely evokes comment; it is “almost a part of the air we breathe.”42
Most recently, a group of scholars with roots in the law and society movement have 
explicitly taken up the banner of New Legal Realism (NLR).43 Like the old realism, the 
new realism includes a heterogeneous group united in their ambition to promote an 
empirically-grounded study of law, which evinces a relatively robust belief in the ability 
of empirical methods to give us reliable access to the objective world – however tentative 
and provisional that knowledge might be.44 In addition to an empirical outlook, NLR 
scholars share a pragmatic attitude towards law as a problem-solving tool. As Gregory 
Shaffer advocates, “New Legal Realists … study how actors use law instrumentally to 
intervene in social contexts to change those contexts.”45 It has been argued that a key 
point of difference between the old and the new realism is that the latter takes more 
explicitly into account critical epistemological challenges to factual and legal construc-
tions.46 Thus, some new realists incorporate the idea of situated knowledge – a critical 
reflection on the role of the social scientist in the production of research outcomes.47 
Nevertheless, the tendency remains strong to view law as an object of study that can be 
tested in order to assess its effectiveness, implementation, and/or impact.48 Arguably, 
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50(3) (2009), 685–758.
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NLR remains attached to a means-ends rationality, while recognizing that ends are not 
fixed but become transformed in the process of acting.
Concerning the law/politics relation, perhaps the closest to the “law-as-politics” 
modality are political scientists of the so-called attitudinal model, who ascribe the out-
come of judicial decisions almost entirely to ideology, rather than legal reasoning, prec-
edent, or statutory text.49 This body of scholarship, dubbed “judicial politics,” joins with 
most radical realist and CLS scholarship in dismissing legal reasoning as ex post facto 
rationalizations. While dominant among political scientists, these studies have been criti-
cized for failing to account for legal variables50 and self-proclaimed new realists have 
parted ways with their presuppositions. Thus Shaffer explicitly argues that “scholars who 
reduce legal interpretation to a form of politics do not capture law’s particular institu-
tional form of reasoning that contributes to law’s meaning.”51 Here is an ironic reversal, 
for the new realists come to the rescue of law as a distinctive form of institutional reason-
ing (hence distancing themselves from the old realists), whereas political scientists, who 
by their epistemological commitments seem closer to the “law-as-science” paradigm 
below, are in this respect much closer to the “law-as-politics” stance. In this way, scru-
tiny of the law and politics node reveals a major fault line in scholarly projects that the 
single umbrella-term New Legal Realism cannot keep united.
II. Law as Political Science
Rather than on the myriad studies conducted under socio-legal research, my focus is 
specifically on the latest and most successful newcomer, Empirical Legal Scholarship 
(ELS), which has been hailed as “arguably the next big thing in legal intellectual 
thought.”52 While sometimes conflated with NLR,53 ELS usually refers to a specific 
variety of empirical research: “a model-based approach coupled with a quantitative 
method.”54 Whether political scientists analyzing data on court opinions, behavioral 
economists relying on experimental psychology, or legal scholars assessing institutional 
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design, “[t]he empirical legal scholar offers a positive theory of a law or legal institution 
and then tests that theory using quantitative techniques developed in the social sciences. 
The evidence may be produced by controlled experiment or collected systematically 
from real world observations. In either event, quantitative or statistical analysis is a cen-
tral component of this project.”55
One significant distinction from NLR is that whereas the latter advocates the study of 
law on the ground, ELS leans towards sophisticated technology, which has been made 
more accessible by a number of public-use databases and statistical software programs.56 
Moreover, in contrast to the old realists’ rule-skepticism and doctrinal indeterminacy, 
ELS often takes doctrine as a source of empirical propositions to be tested, raising con-
cerns about its ability (and willingness) to escape the “pull of the policy audience.”57 
Operating under the shadow of “scientism,” ELS tends to conflate empirical with quan-
titative analyses, displaying a tendency to slight interpretive and qualitative approaches.58 
All this, paired with the self-perception of being the “next big thing,” can lead to losing 
sight of its shortcomings.
We have already mentioned the inability of the attitudinal model to account for legal 
variables.59 But even the variables that are factored undergo the inevitable simplification 
of model-design: “ideology” becomes a proxy for a judge’s politics, which in turn is 
reduced to a liberal/conservative binary code. Yet surely politics cannot be reduced to 
ideology, nor can this binary sense of ideology convey the world-making, complex ways 
in which ideology shapes and interacts with individuals and society (Gramsci, Althusser). 
Thus, the suspicion arises that “the commitment of political scientists to a model of ideo-
logical decisionmaking may be explained in part by its convenience. Not only does the 
model conform to the conventional worldview of political science, but a simple and 
comprehensible theory makes modeling much easier.”60 Omitted variables and simplifi-
cations aside, a wider criticism looms large: to be able to predict the outcome of legal 
disputes, as these studies claim to do, does not tell us all there is to know about the exer-
cise and the value of judgment. As Gregory Sisk writes, “the translation of judicial 
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decisions into mathematical constructs can never fully convey the richness of the legal 
analysis contained in the written decision,” nor can it “capture the full dimension of that 
unique and important enterprise known as judging.”61
Similar concerns extend to behavioral studies on cognitive bias and heuristics, which 
have led to a surge of works suggesting religious bias, labor bias, immigration bias, con-
firmation bias, in-group bias, and so forth.62 These studies have surely enough demol-
ished the myth of a rational actor postulated by legal formalism (and neoclassical 
economics), and yet something is not entirely satisfying in the constant finding of bias. 
In trying to disprove the myth of the rational actor, they seem to posit an ideal against 
which every judgment must, by definition, fall short. Accordingly, all data that deviate 
from the ideal serve as confirmation of “defective” forms of judgment. Read in this light, 
these studies resemble early law and society studies purporting to study the gap between 
law-on-the books and law-in-action, and can be subjected to the same kind of criticism.63 
Rather than taking prejudices as necessary givens of every judgment that might actually 
enrich it (as in the hermeneutic tradition), the constant finding of bias assumes that a gap 
exists and that this gap must be closed. Further, the studies assume that the gap can be 
closed (or severely contained), if only we were cognizant of these biases and made the 
appropriate institutional choices.
None of this should of course be read as a dismissal of empirical work, which can help 
us detect surprising and counter-intuitive findings. There is no denying that considerable 
ingenuity goes into the creation of experimental designs (which involves “as much art as 
science”64) and painstaking efforts are needed for the collection and systematic parsing 
of data. Still, data are not self-explanatory and no method “is sure to provide answers to 
questions that you do not ask.”65 Therefore, the temptation to turn every jurisprudential 
issue into a matter of empirics must be resisted as seriously misguided. Even when the 
claim is the apparently commonsensical admonition to combine quantitative with quali-
tative research, it is worth noting that the goals of different research may not be entirely 
compatible, or subject to the same “metric.”
Concerning ELS’s approach to law and politics, law is taken as an object to be meas-
ured, tested, and causally explained, rather than as something that individuals live by or 
inhabit. Correlatively, politics is viewed as a factor that either determines or heavily 
influences legal behavior, but which can be inoculated by use of the scientific method. 
Thus politics, while inescapable in legal judgment, is conspicuously absent from politi-
cal science. Ironically, those who see nothing but ideology in legal actors fail to con-
sider their own: the politics of knowledge is hidden under the mantle of a “sophisticated 
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methodology” where the researcher appears to remain outside the analysis.66 Drawing 
sharp distinctions between empirical and normative, causal vs interpretive, evaluative 
vs explanatory, this disciplinary project shares with legal realism a positivistic episte-
mology, which (unlike feminists and other critical discourses alluded to earlier), largely 
ignores the problem of the subject,67 as well as the meaning-making, constitutive aspect 
of law.
III. Law as Political Philosophy
If the earlier two categories take law and politics down an empirical path, the next two 
lead us in a different direction. Within law as political philosophy we find, on the one 
hand, a reconstructive stream which seeks to establish the principles of “well-ordered” 
societies, based on principles of justice and overlapping consensus (Rawls), discourse 
theory (Habermas), and a principled judiciary (Dworkin). Reconstructive efforts find a 
most formidable challenge in the agonistic tradition (Mouffe, Tully, Honig), critical of 
former attempts to establish a society whence relations of power have been evacuated, 
and of the very ideal of consensus as prefiguring (and hence limiting) its ends.68 A dif-
ferent stream vindicates a place for philosophical speculation and questions of first 
philosophy,69 not led by immediate practical concerns, and which often require a space 
for silence.70
Recent years have seen a veritable surge of “the political” in continental philosophy 
(Nancy, Lacoue-Labarthe, Lefort, Badiou, Agamben, Negri, Cacciari, Esposito, Laclau, 
Dussel). As popularized by Claude Lefort as part of a wider tradition in France,71 the 
political (le politique) differs from what we ordinarily mean by politics (la politique), 
namely, partisan ideology, parliamentary practice, or Realpolitik. In a world where the 
political has retreated into the givenness of everyday politics and the economy, Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy rescue a second sense of the word retreat, where 
“philosophy should withdraw from politics in order to allow it to ‘rethink’ the political.”72 
We might say that philosophy comes after political life, but it tries to revert this chronol-
ogy by setting politics “on the right track,” as either (or both) principle and beginning 
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(arkhé). As the editors of a recent volume on law and the political suggest, the relation 
between law and the political displaces the question “law is politics,” for it no longer 
seems adequate to treat law as a mere instrument of political power, or to reduce the criti-
cal outlook to the claim that law is politics by other means (in clear allusion to Kennedy).73
I want to highlight two very different scholarly projects: First, a renewed interest in 
the work of Carl Schmitt74: a rich scholarship that stresses the theological underpinnings 
of the modern state75; sovereignty as power over the exception76; the friend/enemy dis-
tinction as an ant-agonistic basis of the political77; the political (rather than normative) 
foundation of the Constitution78; or the constituent power, as pure potentiality separated 
from constituted juridical institutions.79
An alternative, productive scholarship issues from Hannah Arendt,80 who thinks of 
politics as the pluralistic realm of appearance and world disclosure, and retrieves an 
alternative history of law in terms of boundaries and relations.81 Whether successful or 
not, Arendt wishes to escape the logic of sovereignty and the fixation with (the 
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problematique of) the modern state.82 Furthermore, Arendt provides an understanding of 
judgement, “the more political of the human faculties,” which is phenomenologically 
richer than Schmittian decisionism and which is directed not so much at curbing bias or 
ideology as in earlier empirical models, as towards an “enlarged mentality” through role-
taking and empathetic imagination.83 Still, Arendt shares the desire to preserve a pure 
space of politics, free of “contamination” by private and social spheres.84
The latter reveals a general dilemma of law as political philosophy: while the aim 
might be to rethink the possibility of politics, the result is to reinstate philosophy’s “right-
ful” place as the ordering principle. Philosophy reflects on the political as the precondi-
tion for politics (and hence of law), which suggests, to paraphrase Plato, that political 
philosophy appears “thrice removed” from the phenomena of law. More importantly, the 
desire to preserve a realm of pure politics often carries with it a correlative fear of “juridi-
cal contamination,”85 which leads to a total incapacity to think of law “in a different key,” 
that is, to consider for law the same potentiality recognized for the political.
IV. Law as the Political Contingent
This modality arises out of a similar preoccupation with politics, but with an added skep-
ticism towards the pretensions of political philosophy to set it right. Law as the political 
contingent valorizes creative expression, constitutive openness, and unpredictable 
events. Some recent monographs can comfortably be included in this category,86 but here 
I want to highlight the work of Jacques Rancière, who explicitly argues against the 
claims of political philosophy to speak from a position of authority – and more generally 
rejects the language of expertise.87 Since antiquity, political philosophy has sought to 
ground the organizing principles of the community and to remove the obstacles prevent-
ing a well-ordered society.88 Faced with the attempt to ground politics on antecedent 
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principles, Rancière underlines the contingency and precariousness of politics, which 
has “no reason for being,”89 and in respect to which political philosophy “always comes 
too late.”90 He also challenges the attempt to preserve a sphere of “pure” politics from the 
encroachment of everyday life (and from culture, economy, law, and so forth), for it is 
impossible to distinguish in advance what counts as such.
Rancière develops a particular understanding of politics, not as “the set of procedures 
whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organizations of 
powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimating this distribu-
tion” – which he renames police.91 Politics is, by contrast, a process whereby a given order 
or regime of visibility – an order that regulates what is “common-sensical” within a society 
– is interrupted by an egalitarian and dissensual logic that disrupts its naturalness.92 As an 
activity, then, politics is “a mode of expression that undoes the perceptible divisions” and 
“makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where once 
there was only place for noise.”93 Central to this understanding of politics are concepts such 
as wrong, dissensus, subjectivation, equality, and demos, which is the supplementary name 
of those who find no place (are “uncounted”) in the given “distribution of the sensible” 
[partage du sensible].
“The essence of politics is dissensus,” writes Rancière, which is “not a confrontation 
between interests or opinions,” but “the demonstration … of a gap in the sensible [le sen-
sible] itself.”94 “What dissensus means is that every situation can be cracked open from the 
inside [and] reconfigured in a different regime of perception and signification.”95 Arguing 
explicitly against the Habermasian model of communicative action, which presupposes 
equal partners already constituted, the specifics of political dissensus are that its partners 
are no more constituted than the object or the stage itself.96 “Before any confrontation of 
interests and values … there is the dispute over the object of dispute, the dispute over the 
existence of the dispute and the parties confronting each other in it.”97 That is, “the place, 
the object, and the subjects of the discussion are themselves in dispute and must in the first 
instance be tested.”98 This represents a most peculiar platform for argument, for “the 
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speaker has to behave as though such a stage existed, as though there were a common 
world of argument – which is eminently reasonable and eminently unreasonable, emi-
nently wise and resolutely subversive, since such a world does not exist.”99 As Rancière 
puts it, participants in dispute must put “two worlds in one and the same world.”100
How to understand this “paradoxical mise-en-scène”101? Clearly not as a neutral 
forum, nor as a set of procedures shared by all participants. Nor, too, can the stage(ing) 
be said to be wholly unstructurable,102 or incommunicable as a differend.103 Conspicuously, 
Rancière pictures this incommensurability as a form of relation,104 as an encounter or 
meeting point of heterogeneous worlds that are brought together on this very occasion.105 
The creation of these litigious worlds is an aesthetic event, but not a mere invention of 
languages, for a political argument must always be won on pre-existing and constantly 
re-enacted distribution of languages.106 Sharing much with the agonistic tradition, 
Rancière insists on the antagonistic dimension of political encounters.107 Still a political 
disagreement is not simply a Schmittian confrontation between friends and enemies, or 
between ideological camps, but a struggle about what politics is; namely, over questions 
such as “where are we?”, “who are we?”, “what makes us a we?”, “what do we see and 
what can we say about it that makes us a we, having a world in common?”108
How to think of law along the lines of this analysis, or, what would the law of the politi-
cal contingent be? Such work remains to be done, and I can only offer a few general 
remarks here: to begin with, it would have to reject the assimilation of law with statist rule, 
command, or sovereign exception; nor would it fit to think of law as a means, a behavioral 
regularity to be causally explained, or as “contaminating” a realm of allegedly pure free-
dom. I would propose for law a doubling similar to that which Rancière articulates for 
police/politics: On the one hand we would have the order of legalism, that is, the set of 
procedures for the aggregation of consent, the organization of powers, the distribution of 
places and roles, and the system of legitimizing that distribution. On the other hand, a juris-
genetic or norm-generative impulse that would come to interrupt the logic of legalism, by 
putting in question its overarching distribution of roles, places, subjects, and doctrines.109
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How norm-generative moments might emerge in specific legal settings again calls for 
further elaboration. Taking the cue from an important article on the paradoxical subject 
of human rights, a promising avenue may be found in the double existence of rights (and 
arguably of written law in general), which are first inscriptions in the regime of the vis-
ible, but then require to be activated in their potential by those who can make something 
out of that inscription.110 As theorized by Robert Cover, this norm-generating capacity is 
not the privilege of those who hold institutional office, or who are otherwise vested with 
the legal authority to do so. In the wake of radical pluralism, this power is acknowledged 
of anyone whomsoever, undergoing a process of subjectivation, who is able to instantiate 
a wrong in the fabric of legalism.
The staging of polemical scenes brings out the contradiction between the logic of 
legalism and the logic of jurisgenesis in order to reconfigure the legally sayable, think-
able, and doable. Law as the political contingent adopts an anti-positivist epistemology 
that engages the aesthetic world of sense-perceptions, and takes law to be more than an 
instrument to be utilized, as constitutive of self and society. However, the normative 
endeavor is not just world-creating, for it must take into account the pre-existing condi-
tions, the available resources, and the structural limitations upon which it must act. For 
this is necessary to create both the normative language and the stage in which such a 
norm can be properly heard – often challenging the pre-conditions that would preclude a 
normative claim from being heard as properly legal (e.g., jurisdictional barriers). This is 
why this novel sense of law would also have to be accompanied by a rich phenomenol-
ogy of judging in litigious or political contexts.111
* * *
In this article, I have elaborated on four different modes to understand the relations of 
law and/as politics, which leads not only to different disciplinary projects, but to diverg-
ing understandings of both terms. Realists enlist politics to ground law in “real life,” 
rather than in conceptual abstractions; political scientists introduce empirical methods to 
compensate for the lack of those methods in law; political philosophers hope to retrace 
in the political what is eclipsed in the everyday fray; those favoring the political contin-
gent wish to make visible a potentiality that may be hard to perceive within the strictures 
of legalism. But in connecting politics with law each in its own way, the meaning of law 
also shifts: thus realists understand law not as a systematic construction or conceptual 
abstraction, but as means to an end; political scientists take law as a phenomenon to be 
observed, tested, and explained. Political philosophers aim either to reconstruct or to 
question law, according to a philosophically prior reflection; those who undertake the 
political contingent seek to recharge law, just as political philosophers wish to retrace the 
political. These four projects share a critical outlook of law as an autonomous and self-
sustaining discipline. Together, they lay bare the need to rethink the relational aspect of 
law and politics, once the aphorism “law is politics” has lost its critical luster. In my own 
rendering, law and politics are inextricably related, but considering that both law and 
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politics can have a divided phenomenological existence, not all manifestations of law 
and politics are related in the same way, and just as politics cannot be equated with ideol-
ogy, nor can law be equated with legalism.
In expressing my inclination for law as the political contingent, I do not simply 
embrace a form of naive optimism, which is how this debate is often framed by the her-
meneutics of suspicion.112 The relevant issue is not whether one harbors hope, or whether 
one has contrarily lost it, but how to put one’s critical task to its most valuable use. To 
focus on, and to valorize, scenes of dissensus, events of world-disclosure, and spaces for 
aesthetic irruptions113 brings forth an immanent potentiality in law, not because the world 
is “full of possibilities” as the commercial might put it, but because this life-affirming 
move refuses to grant an aura of invincible ubiquity (omnipotent and omnipresent) to 
any description one has reason to reject as a world-picture. Law as a political contingent 
is suspicious of total theories, theories without gaps, including neoliberalism’s attempt to 
present itself as a world system.114 To pay heed to such totalizing claims, even from a 
critical perspective, is to acknowledge them as a power over us that may distract us from 
other relevant tasks.
Against the defeatism that “urges us to admit that all our desires for subversion still 
obey the law of the market,”115 but which “reserve[s] for itself the position of the lucid 
mind casting a disenchanted eye over a world in which critical interpretation of the sys-
tem has become an element of the system itself,”116 the form of critique advanced here 
starts from different presuppositions. Between the unmeetable demand of ethics and the 
instrumental rationality of interests of which Kennedy speaks, between the (empirical) is 
and the (metaphysical) ought, exists a critical space that has to be reclaimed. “Might be” 
is a position that well suits such a critical practice,117 and which starts with a tiny modi-
fication in the posture of a body.118 A political critique of law is not limited to denouncing 
law’s ideological make-up, abuse, or domination, but to inquire into the kind of political 
community that law enables (or denies), and what life-in-common it avails (or excludes). 
For this neither realism’s positivist epistemology, nor political science’s reliance on 
method, nor political philosophy, with its own antecedent language, will suffice. In order 
to sketch a “new topography of the possible,”119 a full dramaturgy of law is needed.
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